• Tianwen-2, launching May 29, 2025, is China’s first asteroid sample return and comet exploration mission, targeting near-Earth asteroid Kamoʻoalewa and main-belt comet 311P/PANSTARRS.
• The spacecraft will collect material from Kamoʻoalewa using touch-and-go and anchor methods, aiming to uncover clues about the solar system’s formation and possibly lunar origins.
• After returning samples to Earth, Tianwen-2 will continue to 311P/PANSTARRS to study its composition and better understand the origins of water and organics in the solar system.

China is preparing to launch its Tianwen-2 space mission on May 29, taking country’s expanding planetary exploration program to its next step.

According to the China National Space Administration (CNSA), the mission will lift off from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest China using a Long March 3B rocket, which is currently being loaded with propellant. The Tianwen-2 probe and its carrier rocket have completed all necessary technical and mechanical preparations, including assembly, testing, fueling, and integration checks. CNSA stated that each element of the mission has passed inspection and joint systems rehearsals.

The Long March 3B rocket has been fully assembled at the launch site and integrated with the probe inside its protective fairing. Final inspections and control checks have been completed by CNSA’s teams at multiple facilities, including the Beijing Flight Control Center and tracking stations in Xi’an and aboard the Yuanwang measurement ships. These assets provide communication and navigation support during launch and early flight.

According to CNSA, the Tianwen-2 spacecraft was transferred to the launch pad after a series of functional verifications. Engineers completed full system rehearsals to ensure mission readiness. These rehearsals simulate the countdown and flight sequence and verify coordination among all ground systems and tracking stations.

Tianwen-2 is the second in China’s series of deep space exploration missions and follows the successful Tianwen-1, which reached Mars in 2021.

As previously reported by Space Insider, China’s Tianwen-2 mission aims to retrieve material from a near-Earth asteroid and study a distant comet, marking a major step in the country’s planetary exploration efforts. The spacecraft will first target asteroid 469219 Kamoʻoalewa, a small object that follows a stable orbit near Earth and may be a fragment of the Moon. Using both touch-and-go and anchor-based techniques, Tianwen-2 will collect surface samples and return them to Earth for analysis.

After completing its sample return, the mission will continue toward comet 311P/PANSTARRS, located in the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter. Known for its multiple dust tails, the comet offers a rare opportunity to study volatile-rich materials that may contain clues about the early solar system and the origins of water and organic compounds on Earth. This second phase of the mission is designed for remote observation rather than sample collection.

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• The U.S. Department of Defense has selected an architecture for “Golden Dome,” a $175 billion missile defense system that will deploy weapons in space for the first time, combining land-, sea-, and space-based technologies.
• Golden Dome will consist of four defensive layers: pre-launch disruption, boost-phase interception, midcourse interception in space, and terminal-phase defense; initial funding of $25 billion is included in President Trump’s proposed budget.
• The system will build on existing missile defense assets while adding space-based interceptors and sensors, with oversight by Gen. Michael Guetlein and full coordination across NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and USSPACECOM; China and Russia have criticized the initiative as destabilizing and militarizing space.

Golden Dome is expected to cost $175 billion, President Donald Trump said as he announced the Department of Defense has selected a plan for the missile defense system that would put U.S. weapons in space for the first time.

“Today, I’m pleased to announce we have officially selected an architecture for this state-of-the-art system that will deploy next-generation technology across the land, sea, and space, and including space-based sensors and interceptors,” Trump said during the May 20 announcement in the Oval Office. Trump noted the first $25 billion for Golden Dome is part of the “Big Beautiful Bill” budget proposal currently working its way through Congress.

While Trump stated the system, one first proposed four decades ago by President Ronald Reagan, would be fully operational by the end of his term in 2029, U.S. officials indicated that a limited capability might be more realistic within that timeframe, the AP reported.

Golden Dome aims to create a four-layered defense strategy. The first tier focuses on pre-launch disruption, targeting enemy capabilities before a missile is fired. The second stage centers on intercepting the missile during its boost phase, when it is most visible and vulnerable. The third targets midcourse interception in space, while the final layer provides terminal phase defense as a missile approaches its target, according to the AP.

“The Golden Dome is a game changer,” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said at the announcement.

According to the Department of Defense, the Golden Dome will build on existing missile defense infrastructure but add a new layer of space-based interceptors and sensors, marking a shift in how the U.S. intends to deter and defeat aerial threats. Current systems such as ground-based interceptors and sea-launched missile defense assets will remain in operation. The initiative is being coordinated with NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and USSPACECOM to ensure full interoperability.

In early May, the Congressional Budget Office lowered cost estimates for deploying and operating space-based interceptors over 20 years, citing lower launch costs. The CBO estimates it to be $161 billion (in 2025 dollars) for the lowest-cost option, down from $264 billion, and $542 billion, down from $831 billion, for the highest-cost alternative.

Oversight of Golden Dome will fall to Gen. Michael Guetlein, the vice chief of space operations, reflecting the elevated role of the U.S. Space Force in future defense planning. Guetlein is expected to coordinate across military branches and defense contractors to accelerate development and deployment.

While technical specifications remain limited, at the announcement Guetlein stressed the need for defense systems capable of intercepting the increasingly advanced missiles being developed around the world, including ballistic missiles with multiple nuclear warheads, hypersonic missiles, and cruise missiles capable of avoiding U.S. detection, along with potential space-based weapons of the future.

In March, Guetlein said at the McAleese Defense Programs Conference in Washington that China and Russia have developed counterspace capabilities such as jamming, spoofing, cyberattacks and directed-energy weapons. Guetlein also said American adversaries were practicing orbital engagements, including shadowing U.S. satellites and testing anti-satellite weapons.

In a joint statement in early May, China and Russia called the Golden Dome proposal “deeply destabilizing in nature” and that they “oppose the attempts of individual countries to use outer space for armed confrontation and will counter security policies and activities aimed at achieving military superiority.”

• China has launched the world’s first space computing constellation, deploying 12 AI-equipped satellites into orbit aboard a Long March 2D rocket on May 14.
• Developed under the “Star Computing” initiative by Guoxing Aerospace and Zhijiang Laboratory, the satellites offer a combined 5 POPS of onboard computing power with inter-satellite laser links at 100 Gbps.
• The constellation is designed to perform in-orbit AI processing, support real-time Earth observation, and serve as the backbone of a future global space-based computing infrastructure.

China has started building a space super computer constellation with the launch of a dozen AI-equipped satellites, the first of a planned several thousand.

On May 14, a Long March 2D rocket lifted off from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, deploying 12 networked satellites developed by Guoxing Aerospace, also known as ADA Space, and Zhijiang Laboratory, according to Guoxing Aerospace and the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation. The mission, codenamed 021, which stands for 0 to 1, is the initial phase of the “Star Computing” program.

Unlike traditional satellites that downlink raw data to Earth for processing, these AI-enabled satellites are built to perform real-time data processing in orbit. Each satellite is equipped with up to 744 trillion operations per second (TOPS) of computing power. Together, the constellation delivers 5 peta operations per second (POPS), which when fully built would make it the most powerful orbital computing network ever deployed.

The constellation architecture includes high-speed inter-satellite laser communication links capable of transferring data at 100 gigabits per second. This allows for distributed computing across the network, enabling tasks like collaborative Earth observation, autonomous AI model training, and near-instant decision-making on scientific events such as gamma-ray bursts.

The satellites carry an AI-based astronomical time domain model and an X-ray polarimeter to detect and classify transient astrophysical events with near-instant reaction time. Officials say the platform enables “day-to-day” computing rather than “day-to-ground,” reflecting a shift in processing workloads from Earth to orbit.

The satellites also feature onboard digital twin generation, allowing them to create real-time 3D maps of Earth-based targets to support industries such as emergency response, urban planning, and remote tourism.

China has become a major player in the global space industry by building a state-backed, vertically integrated ecosystem that blends government support with a growing commercial sector. With over 500 entities—including state-owned enterprises, private firms, universities, and research institutes—China is advancing across launch services, satellite manufacturing, and space operations, all aligned with its geopolitical goals.

The Space Insider Market Intelligence Platform tracks this dynamic sector and now highlights 270 core organizations in its updated China Space Industry Market Map. The platform also identifies key technologies and investment trends. A newly published report, China’s Space Industry: A Strategic Overview, offers a comprehensive analysis of China’s space strategy, technical progress, and commercial developments across launch, satellite production, and capital flows.

The Space Insider Market Intelligence Platform provides a continuously updated analysis of this rapidly evolving sector. Our latest China Space Industry Market Map identifies 270 key players, tracks emerging technologies, and outlines investment opportunities, providing an in-depth view of the market’s trajectory. We have also published a comprehensive report, China’s Space Industry: A Strategic Overview, offering a high-level view of China’s space ambitions, technical capacity, and commercial activity—including launch, satellite manufacturing, and investment trends.

While the full report is only available on the Space Insider Market Intelligence Platform, we’re offering free access to a preview of the report, including the China Space Industry Market Map! Get Instant Access Now: Click Here

Contact the Space Insider Team to inquire about accessing the full report.

Mapping China’s Space Ecosystem: Structure, Segments, and Strategic Focus

China’s space sector is organized around a vertically integrated model anchored by state-owned giants and increasingly populated by commercial firms with targeted capabilities. Our team has provided a comprehensive market map based on the Space Insider Market Intelligence Platform that tracks over 500 active entities, spanning upstream, midstream, and downstream segments, as well as research institutions and state regulators​. While the market map that lists 270 key players is detailed, it is not exhaustive – if you notice an entity that should be included, please contact the Space Insider Team!

Upstream: Space Infrastructure & Development

This segment includes launch vehicle manufacturers, satellite builders, propulsion developers, and subsystems providers. It is dominated by state institutions but is increasingly including private firms. These entities provide the physical backbone of China’s space capability — from rockets and satellites to propulsion systems and payload electronics.

Midstream: Operations & Mission Services

Midstream actors manage satellite constellations, mission planning, ground control systems, and secure data relay. This segment bridges technical deployment with commercial utility, often blending civil and defense functions under a unified operational command structure.

Downstream: Space-Enabled Applications

China’s downstream space market spans EO data analytics, satellite internet, smart city integration, and agricultural monitoring. It includes public-private hybrids and pure commercial firms that use satellite data to power AI-based decision platforms for logistics, urban planning, and environmental surveillance.

Institutional & Research Layer

Underpinning all segments is a dense network of academic institutions, national laboratories, and funding bodies. These entities contribute to satellite design, materials science, and communications R&D. They often spin-off or license tech to commercial players, ensuring scientific advancement remains tied to national capability development.

Launch Capabilities: Anchored in State Players, Pushed Forward by Private Firms

At the core of China’s launch infrastructure are two state-backed giants: the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) and the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST). These institutions have launched over 1,200 satellites since the 1970s and collectively dominate the Long March rocket family portfolio. 

The China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT)

CALT, a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), has delivered over 628 satellite launches since 1970. Its portfolio includes the Long March series, ranging from early hypergolic models to heavy-lift cryogenic variants like Long March 5, and the upcoming 150-tonne-capacity Long March 9 planned for 2033​.

The Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST)

SAST, another CASC subsidiary, is responsible for mid-lift launch systems like the Long March 2D, 4B, and 6A. SAST has launched 626 satellites to date and plays a critical role in medium-payload delivery to LEO and SSO orbits​.

Complementing these legacy players are rising private firms including:

LandSpace

In 2023, LandSpace became the first company worldwide to launch a methane-fueled rocket (Zhuque-2) to orbit. It is developing a reusable stainless-steel rocket, Zhuque-3, with vertical takeoff and landing (VTVL) capabilities​.

Space Pioneer (Beijing Tianbing Technology)

Achieved China’s first successful maiden launch of a liquid-fueled rocket by a private company in 2023. Its Tianlong-3 aims to compete in reusable medium-lift markets​.

Beijing Xingtu (Space Trek)

Specializes in rapid-response, solid-fueled small launchers for both civil and defense applications. Though not yet orbital, the company has laid a technical foundation with suborbital launches and aerospace computing services​.

These commercial entrants signal growing diversity in China’s launch service landscape, though all maintain close technical or financial links with state bodies.

Manufacturing Powerhouses: From State-Controlled to Agile Commercial Operators

China’s manufacturing capabilities are led by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), which has built over 300 spacecraft and serves as the prime contractor for most government and military space programs. CAST provides complete end-to-end services—from design and testing to in-orbit commissioning—and retains ownership of select assets, including the Gaosu Jiguang Zuanshi constellation​.

Alongside CAST, several specialized manufacturers support the broader space ecosystem:

• Chang Guang Satellite Technology (CGSTL): Operator of the Jilin-1 constellation, CGSTL has launched 193 Earth observation satellites since 2015, making it China’s largest commercial satellite manufacturer by volume​.
• Shandong Aerospace Electronic Technology Institute (SISET): Focused on avionics and microelectronics, SISET supplies critical systems to the Beidou constellation and the Tiangong space station. It owns and operates its own satellite, Tianyan-15​.
• Xi’an Institute of Space Radio Technology (XISRT): A CAST subsidiary delivering over 300 space radio payloads for flagship missions such as Chang’e and Tianwen. Its work underpins China’s high-precision satellite comms and navigation architecture​.

SSST at the Forefront: China’s Top-Funded Commercial Space Firm

Among the commercial space firms tracked, SpaceSail (SSST) is the top-funded private company. Specializing in satellite manufacturing, remote sensing, and downstream EO data services, SSST has become a significant commercial actor in China’s Earth observation sector.

While not as globally visible as CGSTL or iSpace, SpaceSail’s investment profile and vertical integration strategy reflect a broader trend: commercial players absorbing government technology and capital to build semi-independent operations. The firm collaborates with both public institutions and private launch providers and is positioned to expand further into satellite analytics, AI-based monitoring, and maritime domain awareness solutions.

As of the latest tracked data, SpaceSail leads all commercial Chinese space firms in cumulative funding raised, benefiting from strong local government support, defense-linked contracts, and strategic integration with urban and environmental planning platforms.

Investment Activity and Market Trends: Capitalizing on State and Venture Support

Since 2020, Chinese commercial space companies have raised over $5 billion in funding, with financial support split between state-led industrial funds and private venture capital. This hybrid structure gives emerging firms access to capital while aligning them with national priorities such as broadband expansion, EO coverage, and strategic autonomy.

Key State-Linked Investment Vehicles

National Manufacturing Transformation and Upgrading Fund (NMTUF)

A central government initiative focused on advancing high-tech industrial capacity. In space, NMTUF has backed launch firms like LandSpace and infrastructure providers like Space Pioneer, often leading funding rounds to de-risk early-stage R&D.

China Aerospace Investment Holdings

A subsidiary of CASC that operates as a strategic investment platform. It funds companies aligned with China’s broader space roadmap, including Beijing Xingtu and other firms working on rapid-launch and communications capabilities.

China Central Television (CCTV) Fund

While not a traditional space fund, CCTV Fund supports high-profile, politically aligned innovation projects. It has invested in Space Pioneer, signaling an interest in shaping public narratives around Chinese commercial space progress.

CITIC Construction Investment and China International Capital Corporation (CICC)

Both are influential state-connected financial institutions with growing exposure to aerospace startups. Their involvement often marks the transition of a firm from experimental to market-ready, as seen in later rounds for Space Pioneer.

Notable Venture-Backed Firms:

Spacety

A leader in small satellite development and rideshare missions, Spacety operates at the intersection of EO and commercial launch demand. It also produces satellite platforms for third parties, including foreign clients.

LandSpace

With over $459 million raised, LandSpace focuses on reusable, methane-fueled rockets and is best known for Zhuque-2. It has drawn funding from Sequoia Capital China, Lightspeed China, and Matrix Partners, reflecting strong venture confidence in its propulsion R&D.

TsingShen

A newer entrant specializing in AI-enabled space applications, TsingShen works on integrating EO analytics and onboard AI processing. It has attracted funding from regional development funds and early-stage VC firms focused on deep tech.

Galactic Energy

A commercial launcher known for its Ceres-1 rocket, Galactic Energy has executed multiple successful launches and serves a growing domestic customer base. It benefits from institutional support and a leaner operational model than state-owned launchers.

Chang Guang Satellite Technology (CGSTL)

Though partially state-backed, CGSTL operates as a commercial entity. It has received investment from Matrix Partners China and Shenzhen Capital Group and has commercialized its Jilin-1 EO constellation for industries ranging from agriculture to disaster response.

This blend of policy-guided investment and competitive venture capital has created a semi-open innovation ecosystem — one that ensures alignment with national objectives while enabling technical differentiation and market-driven growth.

Final Thoughts: A Controlled but Competitive Market

China’s space sector remains largely state-driven, but private participation is growing, particularly in launch services and Earth observation. Commercial players often rely on state institutions for funding, regulatory approvals, and technical support, creating a hybrid model of market-based activity within a centralized framework. The model has proven capable of scaling both capability and access—domestically and globally.

For commercial space players worldwide, China’s space ecosystem represents both a source of potential collaboration and a competitive reference point in a shifting geopolitical landscape.

Access the Full Market Intelligence List and Report

This market map is just the beginning. We have also published a comprehensive report offering a high-level view of China’s space ambitions, technical capacity, and commercial activity—including launch, satellite manufacturing, and investment trends.

While the full report is only available on the Space Insider Market Intelligence Platform, we’re offering free access to a preview of the report, including the China Space Industry Market Map!

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While China’s space ecosystem is complex, it is fully navigable with the right data. The Space Insider Intelligence Platform empowers global space tech leaders, public agencies, and investors with structured, real-time visibility into more than 500 Chinese entities—spanning funding flows, strategic partnerships, and emerging technological capabilities. Whether evaluating market entry, mitigating investment risk, or benchmarking competitors, our AI-powered analytics and expert-led advisory services provide the clarity and foresight needed to lead with confidence.

Unlike static market reports, Space Insider delivers continuously updated insights sourced from over 100,000 data points, transforming fragmented information into decision-ready intelligence. Trusted by organizations such as NASA, ESA, and global quantum security leaders, we help industry stakeholders stay ahead in an increasingly strategic and fast-moving market.

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• A RAND study finds that China’s military views Starlink and other U.S. low Earth orbit constellations as major threats, prompting the rapid development of a Chinese megaconstellation called Project SatNet.
• The People’s Liberation Army sees Starlink as a model for resilient battlefield communications and believes it could support missile defense and offensive operations despite limited public evidence.
• RAND analysts warn that Chinese perceptions of U.S. space dominance are deeply entrenched, making escalation dynamics in space more volatile as China builds countermeasures and expands its own satellite network.

Space is fast becoming a contested military frontier as China races to match and counter U.S. satellite networks in low Earth orbit (LEO).

According to a new RAND report, PLA strategists now view LEO constellations — especially SpaceX’s Starlink — as integral to U.S. warfighting doctrine, and that is influencing Beijing’s mobilization of its own megaconstellation, dubbed Project SatNet, as both strategic parity and a direct countermeasure ​.

PLA Sees Starlink as Strategic Threat

The study, written by by Howard Wang, Jackson Smith and Cristina L. Garafola, finds that PLA observers assume U.S. policy, military doctrine and private-sector launches are tightly coordinated steps toward space dominance. PLA analysts equate Starlink with resilient, proliferated LEO (pLEO) architectures. This strategy relies on the scattering hundreds or thousands of small satellites to ensure network survivability under attack. China regards these constellations as proof of U.S. “hostile intent” to integrate space into joint combat operations, the analysts report. This perspective hardened after Starlink’s real-world utility in Ukraine in early 2022, crystallizing LEO’s perceived military value.

“PLA scholars appear to assess that the United States’ pursuit of military dominance in space reached an inflection point between 2018 and 2022, exhibited by new doctrine and highly threatening new capabilities in LEO, such as Starlink,” the team writes.

PLA threat assessments extend far beyond internet service. Analysts contend that Starlink’s vast network could enable rapid battlefield data processing, resilient communications for aircraft and precision navigation, and even act as an anti-ballistic-missile layer or co-orbital interceptor — functions that exceed publicly acknowledged Starlink capabilities . Such estimates rest on assumptions that Starlink satellites carry electronic-warfare payloads or maneuverable debris shields capable of intercepting missiles, despite little open evidence for such features.

Mapping the Data

To illuminate how senior PLA thinkers and technical experts collectively interpret evolving U.S. space policies and prototype systems, the RAND team surveyed more than 120 open-source Chinese sources, supplemented by state media and industry writings​. (More on the researchers’ methods below.)

Their analysis identifies three core drivers shaping PLA threat perceptions of Starlink:

1. Hostile Intent, rooted in a long-standing PLA view that U.S. space activity pursues unchallenged dominance.
2. Disruption of PLA Operations, as pLEO constellations undercut China’s preferred strategy of neutralizing key orbital nodes.
3. Strategic Instability, given fears that space-based networks could erode China’s nuclear deterrent or conventional balances.

Smaller influences include concerns that Starlink’s commercial internet could evade Chinese information controls and that U.S. satellite suppliers might capture market share in emerging space economies.

Rising China’s SatNet Ambition

In direct response, China has elevated development of its own LEO megaconstellation — dubbed Project SatNet — to national strategic priority status. Established under state-owned China SatNet Co. in 2021, the program is charged with fielding thousands of satellites by the mid-2020s to ensure broadband internet access and military resilience ​. Officials and party cadres have framed SatNet as essential for self-reliance, likening its importance to China’s Beidou navigation system.

More than that, according to the report, China’s efforts to build a megaconstellation are a countermeasure to Starlink.

They write: “The most significant Chinese countermeasure to Starlink appears to be making the development of a corresponding Chinese LEO megaconstellation called Project SatNet a national priority. In addition to acquiring a countermeasure to Starlink, China’s development of Project SatNet is likely motivated by the fear of falling significantly behind U.S. capabilities in space. This dynamic is not unique to Starlink and can be. observed in China’s response to other U.S. capabilities in LEO, such as the spaceplane X-37B.”

Project SatNet’s scope and pace reflect Beijing’s urgency: multiple experimental satellites have already launched, and partnerships with major state firms and PLA-affiliated contractors signal military requirements for command, control and sensing missions. Despite early technical hurdles — such as achieving cost-effective manufacturing and launch comparable to U.S. levels — the state backing and integration with commercial space firms point to accelerated development timelines.

Soft-Kill and Space–Fence Countermeasures

PLA researchers have also proposed an explicit five-part counter-Starlink plan, stressing both technical and informational measures:

• Erect a Chinese “Space Fence” radar network to track the hundreds of Starlink satellites in LEO.
• Catalog Starlink deployments by launch batch to simplify monitoring.
• Demand SpaceX provide precise orbital data for early warning of close approaches.
• Develop “soft-kill” capabilities — ground-based lasers, high-power microwaves or cyber tools — to disable reconnaissance payloads or jam communications.
• Deploy a comparable large-scale Chinese constellation to occupy orbital slots, monitor Starlink and contest its operations ​.

These proposals show that the PLA struggles to target a diffuse constellation with traditional direct-ascent antisatellite weapons. By emphasizing soft-kill tools and mirror constellations, the PLA seeks workarounds to suppress Starlink without triggering full kinetic exchanges.

Disinformation at the UN

Beyond technical plans, Beijing has waged a diplomatic and media campaign to portray Starlink as destabilizing, according to the RAND analysts. Chinese delegates to United Nations space safety meetings have alleged — without evidence — that Starlink satellites endanger China’s Tiangong space station and block developing nations from LEO orbital tracks. State media have repeatedly called for new international rules on “space traffic management” to constrain proliferated constellations ​.

These information efforts feed domestic narratives of U.S. technological aggression and bolster calls for Chinese regulatory responses, despite U.S. offers to share collision-avoidance data. The study highlights this propaganda push as a nonkinetic front in the space competition. A nonkinetic front refers to areas of conflict where nations compete or fight through cyberattacks, electronic warfare, space operations, or information campaigns, without using direct physical force.

Crisis Dynamics in Space

The RAND report cautions that PLA counterspace operations against a resilient U.S. constellation may be seen as less escalatory, raising the risk of provocative acts in orbit. On the other hand, U.S. strikes on Chinese satellites before SatNet is fully operational could be viewed by Beijing as highly escalatory​.

The analysts recommend that U.S. planners avoid costly efforts to mollify Chinese perceptions — since PLA views of U.S. hegemonic intent are deeply entrenched — and instead prepare for an environment where Beijing believes it can act more boldly in space with limited escalation risk. Policies for rapid attribution, allied communications and hardened commercial partnerships will be vital to deter miscalculations.

The team writes: “DoD and the USSF should anticipate and be prepared to counter disinformation campaigns directed toward both government and commercial U.S. assets. The CCP and PLA make little, if any, distinction between public and private assets in space and consider the commercially owned Starlink to be a tool of U.S. military power.”

Study Methods, Scope and Limits

The analysts based their research primarily on authoritative Chinese Communist Party (CCP) media and official People’s Liberation Army (PLA) documents, especially materials from the PLA’s professional military education (PME) curriculum. When official sources were unavailable, they prioritized research from Chinese scholars and practitioners affiliated with key institutions shaping PLA doctrine, such as the Academy of Military Science (AMS), the National Defense University (NDU), and the Aerospace Engineering University. They also included insights from PLA personnel in space-related positions.

To supplement this, the analysts reviewed less-authoritative materials from Chinese defense contractors, like the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), which provide information on relevant technologies and industrial capabilities. In total, they examined about 120 journal articles and 10 PME textbooks, focusing on terms like low Earth orbit (LEO), small and micro satellites, Starlink, and resilient space. This methodology aimed to capture the perspectives of China’s senior leadership while maintaining broad technical coverage.

By design, the analysis relies exclusively on open Chinese sources and does not incorporate PLA internal communications or classified data. This limitation leaves open questions on the true technical maturity of proposed countermeasures and Project SatNet’s operational readiness. Moreover, developments since September 2024—such as new PLA doctrine or satellite tests—may outpace the report’s findings.

Looking Ahead

Future work should track Project SatNet’s first operational launches and any dual-use payload demonstrations. Observers ought to monitor Russian attempts at jamming Starlink in Ukraine, as PLA authors have cited those incidents as validation of soft-kill approaches. Additionally, the pace of U.S. pLEO expansion — including military Starshield payloads — will shape Beijing’s threat calculus and inform the next round of counterspace planning.

For a deeper dive into the topic and recommendations, please read the RAND report.

• China is advancing steadily toward its goal of landing astronauts on the moon by 2030, with spacecraft and rocket systems undergoing key tests as NASA’s Artemis program faces continued delays.
• The China Manned Space Agency has moved into an integrated testing phase for its Long March 10 rocket, Mengzhou crewed spacecraft, and Lanyue lunar lander, according to the South China Morning Post.
• At a Shanghai presentation, China appeared to support a Russian plan to build a nuclear reactor on the Moon by 2035 to power its planned lunar base, Reuters reported.

China is pressing ahead with its plan to land astronauts on the moon by 2030, completing key tests of its lunar landing spacecraft and rocket systems even as the U.S. program faces ongoing delays.

The country’s human spaceflight agency said this week that trials of its Mengzhou crewed spacecraft and Lanyue lunar lander have been completed “as scheduled,” along with several critical component tests. The progress keeps China’s moon ambitions on track, marking the latest step in its long-term plan to build a sustained presence on the lunar surface, South China Morning Post reported.

“The overall development of various manned lunar missions … is progressing smoothly. The Long March 10 and Mengzhou spacecraft are carrying out prototype development and testing as planned,” Lin Xiqiang, deputy director of the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA), said, as reported by SCMP.

While Beijing’s timeline still trails behind Washington’s, the race for the moon is increasingly defined by questions of who can establish infrastructure first and shape operational norms in space. Both China and the United States have staked claims on the lunar south pole — considered a strategic region for future exploration due to its suspected reserves of water ice.

Integrated Testing Phase

The China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) said it is now moving into a phase of integrated testing focused on the Long March 10 rocket, a three-stage superheavy launcher; the Mengzhou spacecraft, which will transport crew to lunar orbit; and the Lanyue lander, which will carry astronauts to the moon’s surface. These next steps include emergency escape drills, tethered engine ignition and simulations of the lander’s take-off and descent, according to the SCMP.

The Long March 10 will be a new addition to China’s heavy-lift rocket family, specifically designed for the lunar mission. Mengzhou, expected to carry multiple astronauts, must pass rigorous safety trials for launch scenarios and spaceflight stress, while the Lanyue lander will undergo mobility and landing tests on Earth as a precursor to its actual deployment on the moon.

NASA’s Artemis Program

Although China has not yet flown a full lunar test mission, its timeline has remained consistent and measured. In contrast, NASA’s Artemis program — which plans to return U.S. astronauts to the moon for the first time since 1972 — has encountered a series of setbacks. In December, the U.S. space agency announced delays to the Artemis II mission, now scheduled for early 2026, and pushed its planned lunar landing under Artemis III from 2026 to at least mid-2027, the South China Morning Post pointed out.

NASA’s Artemis I, an uncrewed test of the Space Launch System and Orion spacecraft, completed a round-trip to the moon in late 2022. While the mission was broadly seen as a success, problems with Orion’s heat shield during atmospheric re-entry led to technical reviews and modifications, which have contributed to subsequent delays.

International Partnerships

Among those partnerships is a planned flight of two Pakistani astronauts to China’s Tiangong space station. One of them will serve as a payload specialist. The selection marks a rare example of spaceflight collaboration with another nation, reinforcing China’s intention to lead a separate and distinct network of international space activity.

The lunar south pole remains the prime target for both nations. Scientists believe the region’s craters may harbor water ice, which could be critical to sustaining life and supporting rocket fuel production for further deep space missions. Establishing access to those resources first could offer a major strategic advantage.

China has steadily expanded its space portfolio in recent years. Its Tiangong space station is now fully operational, with regular crewed missions. The country also landed a rover on Mars in 2021 and has successfully returned lunar soil samples from robotic missions.

Chinese-Russian Lunar Nuclear Plant

China’s vision for a permanent lunar outpost extends beyond space boots on the ground. At a recent presentation in Shanghai, Pei Zhaoyu, chief engineer of the country’s planned 2028 crewed mission, outlined infrastructure proposals for the base, including large-scale solar power arrays and surface-laid pipelines and cables to distribute electricity and heat. The presentation, attended by officials from the 17 countries and organizations participating in the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), highlighted China’s effort to position itself as a leader in long-term lunar development, Reuters reported.

In a more ambitious move, China appears to be endorsing a plan first proposed by Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, to deploy a nuclear reactor on the Moon by 2035. The reactor would supply consistent power for the ILRS and could represent a critical step toward supporting sustained human presence in the harsh lunar environment. While Beijing has not formally confirmed the nuclear project, its inclusion in an official presentation suggests at least tacit approval, according to Reuters.

The proposed nuclear energy unit would significantly bolster the ILRS, which China plans to build at the Moon’s south pole.

China’s timeline to complete a “basic model” of the ILRS aligns with 2035, as previously outlined by Wu Weiren, chief designer of the Chinese Lunar Exploration Project and a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering.

• China is accelerating the development of Thailand’s space industry through technology transfers, joint satellite missions, and talent development initiatives.
• Thailand’s GISTDA is working with over 10 Chinese organizations on projects ranging from satellite manufacturing to participation in China’s lunar exploration missions.
• Educational and research exchanges, including a joint master’s program with Wuhan University, are helping to train the next generation of Thai aerospace professionals.

China is deepening its role as a key partner in Thailand’s expanding space program, recent news report suggests. The collaboration is delivering both equipment and expertise that are accelerating Thailand’s aerospace ambitions.

The cooperation spans research, satellite development, lunar missions, and education programs, according to reports. Chinese-built testing equipment now sits inside Thailand’s Space Krenovation Park in Sriracha, Chonburi Province—roughly two hours southeast of Bangkok—where institutions like the Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency (GISTDA) operate satellite development labs and control rooms, Xinhua reports. Xinhua is China’s official state-run news agency and serves as a primary outlet for the Chinese government’s communications and perspectives.

The news service reports these initiatives reflect growing cross-border ties in space exploration and technology.

“Thanks for China’s support for Thailand in the space technology field, the cooperation with China has promoted the rapid development of Thailand’s space industry,” said Atipat Wattanuntachai, mechanical lead engineer at Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency (GISTDA).

Vibration Testing Equipment

Thailand’s current centerpiece satellite is THEOS-2 — Thailand Earth Observation System-2, a low-earth orbit satellite for Earth observation. Chinese-manufactured vibration testing equipment is used to assess its performance and launch readiness, according to Xinhua. The equipment is one of several infrastructure contributions made by China to boost Thailand’s space capabilities.

GISTDA, which reports to Thailand’s Ministry of Higher Education, Science, Research and Innovation, is spearheading this modernization. The agency is tasked with developing Thailand’s aerospace programs and geographic information technologies, including satellite-based remote sensing services.

China has become a central partner in that mission, according to XInhua.

China is an important partner in the fields of Thailand’s aerospace technology and geographic information, said Phee Choosri, deputy executive director of GISTDA, in the interview with Xinhua. He added that the GISTDA has collaborated with more than 10 Chinese organizations in these fields. These collaborations ranged from applied research to upstream industries and even space exploration.

International Lunar Research Station

The cooperation goes beyond satellites and ground systems. Last year, China and Thailand signed two formal agreements — known as memorandums of understanding — to strengthen collaboration on the peaceful use of outer space and on a planned international lunar research station. Thailand also hosted its first exhibit of lunar samples from China’s Chang’e-5 mission in July 2024. According to Xinhua, the event drew large crowds, demonstrating rising domestic interest in space exploration.

As further evidence of the growing cooperation. Thailand will send a space weather monitoring payload aboard China’s Chang’e-7 lunar mission. The instrument will measure cosmic radiation and other space weather from the Moon’s surface, providing valuable data for long-term lunar operations.

“Space exploration is a mission that Thailand attaches great importance to,” said Phee. “And the cooperation with China in Chang’e mission provides Thailand with the opportunity to get involved in high-tech projects, promoting the development of Thai space technology, and cultivating Thai talents in the fields of aerospace technology.”

Space Seeding

China’s collaboration with Thailand also supports more novel research initiatives. In October 2024, China retrieved its first reusable satellite, Shijian-19, which carried international payloads — including one from Thailand. The Thai experiment involved sending local rice seeds into orbit to test how they respond to space conditions, a move intended to explore crops resilient to extreme environments.

Phee said that seeding programs like this one serve dual purposes: enhancing national food security and laying the groundwork for participation in the emerging space economy.

The countries are also collaborating on talent developmen, a recurring theme in the partnership. Thailand’s GISTDA and China’s Wuhan University co-launched a graduate program in geographic information science, aimed at building the next generation of specialists in satellite data and analysis. Thailand is also a member of the Beijing-based Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), which hosts regular exchanges on satellite design and space engineering across the region.

Atipat emphasized the impact these exchanges are having on Thai youth. “The greatest beneficiaries of these projects are the young generation who have space dreams,” he said. “Through cooperation and exchanges or further studies in China, these young Thai people have learned cutting-edge technologies in the aerospace field, further igniting their space dreams.”

From satellite manufacturing to moon-bound payloads, China is supplying the tools, platforms, and programs that Thailand needs to join the space economy. Whether these efforts will give Thailand a lasting presence in the commercial or scientific space sectors remains to be seen. But Thai officials are optimistic.

“China is one of the world’s leading aerospace powers and an important promoter of the global space economy and industry,” said Phee. “Deepening cooperation with China in the aerospace field will bring many important opportunities and benefits to Thailand.”

He added that Thailand hopes to one day compete globally in space technology and secure a place in the evolving space economy.